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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
#2A-l/3/77 
BOARD DECISION-AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1961 
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LOCAL 1, SASOC, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
On December 31, 1975, the Council of Supervisors and Administrators of 
the City of New York, Local 1, SASOC, AFL-CIO (CSA) filed a charge alleging 
that the City School District of the City of New York (District) violated CSL 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) in that it unilaterally changed its policy regarding the 
1 
granting of sabbatical leaves. A hearing officer found that the District had 
unilaterally changed its practice regarding the granting of sabbatical leaves 
to supervisory employees represented by CSA and that this was a violation of 
CSL &209-a.l(d), but not of CSL §209-a.l(a). This matter comes to us on the 
exceptions of the District from the decision of the hearing officer. 
1 These sections of the Act make it an improper employer practice deliberately 
"(a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for 
the purpose of depriving them of such rights; ...[or] (d) to 
refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly recognized or 
certified representatives of its public employees." 
»•!£* 
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We first considered this matter on October 8, 1976 and issued an Interim 
Decision (9 PERB 1(3074). In that Interim Decision we summarized the material 
facts indicated by the testimony and the exhibits and concluded that they did 
not support the finding of the hearing officer "that the routine granting of 
sabbatical leaves to eligible applicants was part of the prevailing terms and 
conditions of employment of supervisory employees in the negotiating unit...." 
However, we noted that a document which did not appear to be a part of the 
record, but which was referred to in CSA's brief, might supply the necessary 
proof to confirm the hearing officer's determination. As described more fully 
in our Interim Decision, that document was a publication of the District 
entitled, "Manual of Personnel Policies and Procedures of the City School 
District of New York". We, therefore, remanded the matter to the hearing 
officer for information that would permit us to ascertain whether the Manual is 
a part of the record or a document of which administrative notice may be 
properly taken and, if so, to afford the parties an opportunity to present 
additional evidence relating to it. 
Having reviewed the materials now transmitted to lis by the hearing 
officer, we determine that the Manual is not part of the record. We also 
determine that it is an official and public record of the District which, as 
CSA argues, is in the nature of a business record. As such, it would have been 
admissible into the record, but it is not a document of which we can take 
administrative notice. The law with respect to such public documents is that 
they are competent evidence notwithstanding the restrictions of the "hearsay" 
2 
rule. The reason for their admissibility is their reliability as prima facie 
statements of the allegations of fact that they contain. That reliability, 
2 New York Jurisprudence, Vol 22, §549. 
451? 
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however, is not sufficient to justify administrative notice, which is appro-
priate only to establish "facts which do not admit of contradiction...." 
Thus, we are compelled to disregard the Manual in reaching our determination, 
which is that the evidence does not support the charge. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated-:—Albany^—New-York-
January 5, 1977 
TsSlSer't D. Heisby^Gliairman 
Jos'eph/R. Crowley 
DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE. CONSIDERATION 
OR DECISION OF THIS CASE. 
Ida Klaus 
3_ New York J u r i s p r u d e n c e , Vol. 2 1 , §9. 
*JXO 
{ 'X; 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and 
UNIFORMED SANITATIONMENS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 831, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS; 
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 94, 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, 
AFL-CIO; and CORRECTION OFFICERS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenors. 
#2B-l/5/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1496 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the respondent, City of 
New York (City) and of the Uniformed Sanitationmens Association, Local 831 (USA) 
one of the three intervenors, from the hearing officer's determination that the 
City violated CSL §209-a.l(d) in that it failed to negotiate in good faith with 
the charging party, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New 
York, Inc. (PBA). The hearing officer found two actions of the City constituted 
refusals to negotiate in good faith. One was its entering into "parity" agree-
ments with the USA and the other two intervenors, The Uniformed Firefighters 
Association, Local 94, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO (UFA) 
and the Correction Officers Benevolent Association (COBA) requiring it to extend 
to them any more favorable terms and benefits thereafter obtained by PBA in 
negotiations. The second was its reliance upon those "parity" agreements to 
resist PBA's demands during negotiations for wage increases greater than those 
granted to the intervenors. 
Prior collectively negotiated agreements between the City and the PBA 
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and between the City and the three . intervenors had expired on June 30, 1974. 
Those agreements and the City's agreement with COBA contained "parity" clauses. 
Typical of them is the City-USA parity clause, which provides: 
"[i]t is expressly understood and agreed that should, at any time 
during the term of the Agreement, the City of New York, or any 
Mayoral. Agency or instrumentality thereof, be or become, directly 
or indirectly, a party to any agreement or obligation (in any way 
resulting from the collective bargaining process) negotiated, con-
summated, executed, or awarded, in whole or in part, with respect 
to comparable employees [there follows formula language which 
encompasses, among others, employees in the negotiating unit 
represented by PBA] where such agreement or obligation is as to 
suclT"trerm."or-cohditiun^in~any~resperct—on—batanceT^nrore^favoxable^ 
to the employees participant therein than any of the terms and 
conditions hereof then such more favorable term or condition shall 
be extended to the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association at its 
option." 
This agreement on "parity" did not become public information until October 23, 
1974, the day on which the USA contract was filed with New York City's Office 
of Collective Bargaining, but there had been .rumors indicating that such a 
clause had been included in the agreement prior thereto. 
As part of the negotiations process between the City and PBA under the 
New York City Collective Bargaining Law, on December 9, 1974 a hearing was held 
before the City's Board of Collective Bargaining to determine whether the partie 
were at impasse, during which the City referred to the "parity" clauses. There-
after the unresolved issues, which included the salary dispute, were submitted 
to an impasse panel under §1173-7.0(c) of that law. That impasse panel held 
fourteen days of hearings between January 21 and February 19, 1975. D.uring the 
course of these hearings, the City argued that its financial ability to pay for 
the PBA demands was impaired by reason of the "parity" clauses. For example, 
on February 13, 1975, the City argued that: 
"It [the parity clause] is vitally pertinent to the outcome of 
this proceeding.... The fact is that...as long as it stands in 
the contract, the Panel is obliged to consider as a further 
impact what will be the consequence of meeting the demands of 
PBA. ..which puts the City in the untenable position of being 
obliged to deal not only with a demand such as we have before us 
now but to bear the burden which might flow if their demand was 
met favorably by the Panel." 
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The City introduced evidence that the "parity" clauses would cost it about 
triple the amount that it would have to pay employees represented by PBA for 
each dollar in excess of the UFA/USA formula. 
The hearing officer concluded that, by using the "parity" agreements as 
a basis for resisting PBA demands, the City refused to negotiate in good faith 
with PBA. He further concluded that the City violated its duty to negotiate in 
good faith with PBA when it agreed to the "parity" clauses. These conclusions 
are contested by the City and by USA. The exceptions of the City and USA also 
argue that the charge was not timely, that the issue has become moot, and that 
the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of the contracts entered 
into between the City and the intervenors. USA also raises procedural objec-
tions to the conduct of the hearing which, in substance, constitute a protest 
to the failure of the hearing officer to dismiss the charge. 
Discussion 
Having reviewed the record, heard oral argument, and read the extensive 
and thorough briefs, we confirm the hearing officer's findings of fact and his 
conclusion of law that a "parity" clause is a prohibited subject of negotiations 
In Matter of the City of Albany (Firefighters), 7 PERB 113079, we deter-
mined that a demand for "parity" is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. We 
said (at page 3146) that the parties demanding "parity" were, in effect, seeking 
"to be silent partners in negotiations between the employer and employees in 
another negotiating unit" and that "an agreement of this type between the City 
and other employee organizations would improperly inhibit negotiations between 
the City and another employee organization representing employees in a different 
unit." The New York City Board of Collective Bargaining has also dealt with the 
negotiability of demands for "parity". It reached this issue in Matter of 
Uniformed Fire Officers Association, B-14-72, and in Matter of Lieutenants' 
Benevolent Association, B-10-75, and determined that "parity/differential clauses 
%ute_|. 
Board - U-1496 
-4 
establishing fixed pay relationships with other titles which must be maintained 
throughout the life of a contract are incompatible with sound bargaining prin-
ciples...." The issue before us in the instant case goes beyond our holding 
in the Albany case; we are now asked to determine whether a demand for "parity" 
is not only a non-mandatory, but is also a prohibited, subject of negotiation. 
The opinion of the Board of Collective Bargaining in B-10-75 contains an illu-
minating~discussion~of~ the ^ arguments that^were^presented ~to~±t—±n~~:B=14=72~, 
saying, 
"In that case the City maintained that parity clause advanced 
by the Uniformed Firefighters Association seeking equality in 
the wage levels of Firefighters and Patrolmen, and a clause 
advanced by the Uniformed Fire Officers Association establishing 
and maintaining a 3.0 to 3.9 wage relationship between the Fire-
fighters and Fire Officers were 'prohibited, or at leas£, per-
missive subjects of bargaining.' The City maintained in that 
case that a parity or differential clause, if agreed to by the 
City, would constitute an improper labor practice because it 
would interfere with the bargaining rights of employees in the 
benchmark title who were represented by a different union, not a 
party to the parity agreement; would require the City to make 
automatic and unilateral changes in terms and conditions of 
employment; and would involve the City in assisting the contracting 
union to limit, control or otherwise adversely affect the bargaining 
in the unit of benchmark employees." 
The arguments of the City in B-14-72 are supportive of our reasoning in 
this case. So is a recent decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Local 
1219, International Association of Firefighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations 
Board, Conn. (1976), 93 LRRM 2098. In that decision, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court confirmed a determination of the defendant Board that a "parity" 
clause of an agreement between the Borough of Naugatuck and Local 1219 was void 
and unenforceable notwithstanding an arbitration award that would have commanded 
adherence to that award. The Connecticut court noted with approval that, 
"[t]he Board concluded that the mere presence and necessary operation 
of the clause would inevitably interfere with, restrain and coerce 
the police union in future negotiations with the City...." 
I 
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It reasoned that the "parity" clause thwarted the duty of the contracting 
parties to refrain from interfering with, coercing or restraining the negotiating 
rights of employees in a second negotiating unit. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court (Doyle v. Troy-y 51 AD 2d 845, Third Dept. [1976]). In that 
decision, the court declared invalid a provision of the City Charter of Troy 
which provided for "parity", saying: 
"Since the instant Charter provision impairs the full range of 
negotiations to which the City is entitled under the Taylor Law, 
it is inconsistent therewith and unauthorized and prohibited." 
If, notwithstanding the obvious waiver arguments, a City Charter provision 
establishing "parity" must fall before the City's right to negotiations under 
the Taylor Law, a_ fortiori it must fall before such rights of an employee 
organization that had no part in the establishment of the clause. 
The USA brief argues that "parity" clauses should be at least permissive 
subjects of negotiation under the Taylor Law because they are mandatory subjects 
of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. For its interpretation 
of the private sector statute, USA relies upon a decision of the National Labor 
Relations Board in Teamsters Local 126 (Inland Trucking Co.) 176 NLRB #52, 
71 LRRM 1661 (1969). In that decision, the National Labor Relations Board 
adopted the dictum of a trial examiner's decision that, 
"Even if the Union had in fact insisted on the parity clause, I 
would find no violation in its having done so. Manifestly, the 
parity clause dealt with wage rates, a mandatory subject of 
bargaining upon which the Union could insist to and beyond the 
point of impasse." 
The holding, however, was that, 
"[T]he union did not insist upon the clause in question as a 
condition to entering into any contract, but merely advanced it 
as one way of achieving parity with Appleton employees." 
m% 
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The facts of that case were that a union was demanding of an employer associ-
ation "parity" in the rates paid by some employers to its members with the 
rates paid by other employers to members of another union. The circumstances 
i 
are clearly distinguishable from those in the instant case, as noted in the 
trial examiner's decision adopted by the NLRB: 
"In the instant situation the subsequent bargaining is free and 
competitive. Moreover, in the instant case the subsequent bargain-
ing which would affect the terms of the contract being negotiated 
was not to be done by either of the parties to the instant contract." 
In the case before us, the negotiations subsequent to the "parity" agreement 
involved the same employer who would be bound by that "parity" agreement and 
was, therefore, neither free nor competitive. 
We recognized in our Albany decision, supra, that, 
" [settlements often follow established patterns, historical 
relationships, as well as cost of living indices. In nego-
tiations, parties appropriately develop demands that reflect 
an awareness of such patterns and relationships. This is not 
inappropriate." 
A similar distinction between "parity" and "pattern" bargaining was noted in 
the cited OCB decisions. Indeed, CSL §209.9(c)(v)a. indicates that where . 
interest arbitration is used to resolve negotiations deadlocks, the arbitra-
tion panel should consider a 
"comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of 
the employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the 
wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other employees 
performing similar services or requiring similar skills under 
similar working conditions....", 
but CSL §209.4(c)(v)b. also requires such an arbitration panel to consider, 
"The financial ability of the public employer to pay." 
In this case, the City, by entering into "parity" agreements, has dimin-
ished its financial ability to grant benefits to employees represented by PBA 
beyond the formulas contained in the agreements negotiated with the interveners 
In brief, the "parity" agreement inhibits the public employer from evaluating 
or negotiating over PBA demands on their merits, but, requires it to view 
4524 
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PBA demands in the light of the "parity" agreement.. Inevitably this interferes 
with the negotiation rights of PBA. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. NLRB, 492 F2d 63 
(1974), the Second Circuit said (at p. 70): 
"Even though in an interdependent economy the wages of one group 
of workers potentially might affect the wages of all other workers, 
an employer generally cannot bargain with a union over the wages 
that the union will negotiate with other employers [citation and 
footnote omitted]." 
Similarly, a union cannot bargain with an employer over the wages that the 
employer will negotiate with other unions absent evidence that other employees' 
wages vitally affect terms and conditions of employment. In our judgment, the 
"parity" clause has this effect. 
The exceptions that are directed to the timeliness of the charge are 
based upon the proposition that the charge became ripe on July 18, 1974, rather 
than on October 23, 1974. We accept the analysis of the hearing officer that 
PBA did not have reliable information regarding the existence and nature of 
the "parity" clauses until they were filed with OCB and that "it was reasonable 
for PBA to have an opportunity to study the actual text of the clause before 
acting." We also reject the exceptions that are directed to the mootness 
of the charge for the reasons stated in the hearing officer's decision. Fur-
ther, we reject the exceptions directed to the proposition that PERB is 
without jurisdiction to make a determination that involves the contracts 
between the City and the intervenors. In addition to the reasoning of the 
hearing officer, which we accept, we note the determination of the National 
Labor Relations Board in National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO (Vantage 
Steamship Corp., 196 NLRB #166, 80 LRRM 1198 (1972). In that case, the NLRB 
ordered a union and an employer to cease and desist from entering into or 
giving effect to certain clauses in a collective bargaining agreement. The 
Board reasoned that those clauses worked to the detriment of persons who were 
not party to that agreement and violated NLRA §8 (3). Although there are 
4525 
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important differences between the powers of the NLRB under the National Labor 
Relations Act and the powers of PERB under the Taylor Law, with respect to 
the instant matter, those differences go to remedy and not to jurisdiction 
over conduct that interferes with protected rights. 
Finally, we reject the contention advanced in the exceptions that this 
Board lacks jurisdiction or authority to declare a "parity" clause to be a 
prohibited subject of negotiations absent some explicit statutory declaration 
or indication that it is an impermissible subject. 
Admittedly, there is no expressed limitation on the scope of negotiations 
in the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. However, this Board, in 
interpreting the act, has found some limitations and restrictions on the scope 
of negotiations. The Court of Appeals has endorsed the concept that this 
Board has the power to supervise the negotiating process •— not to the extent 
of compelling the inclusion of a substantive subject in the negotiated agree-
ment — but to the extent of finding that a subject, such as class size, is 
not a mandatory subject of negotiation, West Irondequoit Teachers Association 
v. Helsby, 42 AD 2d 808, affirmed 35 NY 2d 46 (1974). This finding was made and 
approved by the Court even in the absence of any statute stating that the 
specific subject — class size — is not a mandatory subject. 
The issue in the instant case does go beyond the class size decision; the 
determination there was that there was no duty to negotiate over the demand; 
here the determination is that a demand is a prohibited subject of negotiation. 
This Board has, in a prior decision, determined that the subject of an agency 
shop is a prohibited subject, Matter of Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Association, 
3 PERB 1(3104 (1970), confirmed Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 AD 2d 265 (1973). This 
decision, which was based upon implicit rather than explicit statutory author-
ity, was confirmed in court. Further, the Court of Appeals has stated that 
this Board has been delegated the power to resolve disputes arising out of 
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negotiations and inherent in this delegation is the power to interpret and 
construe the statutory scheme, West Irondequoit Teachers v. Helsby, supra. 
A "parity" clause is not expressly prohibited by statute, but an analysis 
of its effect indicates that it is implicitly prohibited by reason of its 
inhibiting effect upon related collective negotiations. Under a "parity" clause 
employer' agrees •.with- one 'employee- organization 'representing 'one • group of munici-
pal employees, not only upon the terms and conditions of employment, economic 
an 
or otherwise, under which its constituents will be employed, but also agrees 
that any higher wage or any other more favorable term and condition agreed 
upon in subsequent negotiations with another employee organization representing 
another group of municipal employees, shall be granted to the employees 
represented by the first organization. Such an agreement seriously inhibits 
the second employee organization in its negotiations with the employer. For 
example, assume that the first organization sought other benefits in lieu of 
a substantial increase in wages and, having obtained such other benefits, 
settled for a three percent wage increase and that the cost of such benefits 
and the wage increase represented to the employer an overall increase of labor 
costs for that unit of six percent. Now, assume that a second employee 
organization comes to the negotiating table and its constituents are interested 
only in a wage increase of six percent and would eschew the other benefits 
granted to the first organization. Absent the "parity" clause, the employer 
would consider the demand solely on the merits and could accede to the wage 
demands, for it would be in accord with the overall cost increase of six 
percent. However, because of the "parity" clause, the employer will, of 
necessity, consider the demand of the second employee organization, not on its 
merits, but upon the impact that the grant of such demand would have in 
increasing the cost of the prior negotiated contract. Obviously the negotiation 
opportunities of the second organization are constricted by the agreement of 
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the first. Moreover, as we said before, the first organization, having 
achieved its negotiation goal, does, by reason of the "parity" clause, seek to 
participate as a silent partner in the second employee organization's 
negotiations. 
Clearly, in the grant of rights to public employees in Civil Service Law 
sections 202 and 204.2, the intent of the Legislature was that public employees 
have the right to be represented by an employee organization of their choosing 
•amd-to-have—such-representative-negotiate- about their—terms—and—conditions—of— 
employment. The statute contemplates that their negotiation representative 
should be able to seek improvements in whatever terms and conditions of employ-
ment that are a matter of concern to them, to determine their negotiating 
priorities and not to be limited, curtailed or foreclosed by the terms that 
another employee organization has negotiated. To permit a "parity" clause, 
therefore, would diminish the legislative grant of rights, if not make them 
illusory, and thus would contravene the letter and intent of CSL sections 202 
1 
and 204.2. " . 
The result reached herein is not contrary to the decision of the Court of 
Appeals in Board of Education of Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of 
Huntington, 30 NY 2d 122 (1972). In subsequent decisions the Court of. Appeals 
clarified its holding to the effect that the scope of negotiations is limited by 
plain and clear prohibitions in statutory or decisional law and by public policy 
"whether derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in statute or decisional 
law, or in neither." Syracuse Teachers Association v. Board of Education, 
1 A "parity"clause must be distinguished from pattern bargaining. It is 
one thing, as in the case of pattern bargaining, for an employer to 
conclude that its resources would permit only a six percent increase to 
its employees and then to have each negotiating unit negotiate which of 
the terms and conditions are to be improved within that limitation. It is 
another thing, as in the case of "parity" negotiations for the first employee 
organization to determine its priorities and thereby foreclose such freedom 
from other employee organizations or- to make them beneficiaries in subsequent 
negotiations. Either effect of a "parity" clause precludes affective and 
meaningful negotiations subsequently with other employee organizations. 
45^8 
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35 NY 2d 743 (1974) and Matter of Susquehanna Valley School District, 37 NY 2d 
614, 616-7 (1975). 
We conclude that bargaining for, or the agreement to, such a "parity" 
clause effectively precludes the meaningful implementation of grant of nego-
tiating rights to public employees and thus contravenes the statutory scheme. 
For these reasons, we conclude a "parity" clause to be a prohibited 
subject of negotiation. However, in the instant case, it would seem inequitable 
to declare that the City was guilty of an improper practice in entering into 
the "parity" clauses, this Board, in the Matter of City of Albany, supra, had 
only indicated that such clauses were nonmandatory. It was not necessary to, 
and we did not, reach the question of whether they were prohibited. Therefore, 
the City should not be stigmatized because it agreed to such a clause. It is 
sufficient that the determination herein is that such clauses are prohibited 
and, therefore, unenforceable, and that the City violated the Act in its 
reliance upon such clause in negotiations with PBA. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the above findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, and in view of the specific violations of the City's duty to 
negotiate in good faith that we have found, 
WE ORDER the City of New York to negotiaJ.e_in good faith. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
January 5, 1977 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
/To sylph R. Crowley 
A«W9 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF BOARD MEMBER IDA KLAUS 
The Board has now declared, as a matter of its own basic decisional 
law, that a "parity" clause is a prohibited subject of negotiation and, 
hence, unenforceable. It has found further that reliance on such clause in the 
course of negotiations with another organization representing a different 
~un±t~contravene~s~tlie~good^fait~h~fra^^ rcannot 
agree with either conclusion. 
The "parity" provision here in question was negotiated in each instance 
as part of an overall agreement of definite duration as to wages, hours, 
and working conditions. The clause undertakes to grant to the employees in 
the units covered by the agreement the benefits of more favorable terms 
that may thereafter during the life of that agreement be reached with other 
organizations for similar categories of employees in other units. 
Both the hearing officer and the Board have found that the clause was 
not deliberately devised by either side for the purpose of depriving employees 
represented by PBA of their rights under the Act. Nor has it been found 
that the intent of the City and each of the signatories to the basic agreements 
was to impose upon the PBA unit through the mechanism of the "parity" clause 
the terms of their basic agreements. Rather, the majority's conclusion 
is that the clause "is implicitly prohibited by reason of its inhibiting 
effect upon related collective negotiations." 
In my view, this Board is without authority to declare such clause to 
be illegal per se, and thus to be outlawed as a subject of negotiation. 
The Court of Appeals has now established and clarified through pro-
gressive decisions the guiding principles which govern the legally allowable 
scope of negotiations under the Act. Those decisions reflect a clear 
disposition toward an expansive view of the reach of the basic collective 
negotiation policy of the Act and toward a narrow definition of its 'Tt*J£>xj 
exceptions. 
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A provision in a collective agreement negotiated by a public employer 
is valid if it constitutes a "term or condition" as defined by the Act, unless 
other applicable statutory or decisional law prohibits its making. While the 
prohibition is not to be deemed to exist only where a particular subject is 
J^expJLicitly and definitively" proscribed^ it must nevertheless be "plain 
and clear", Huntington, supra, as clarified by Syracuse Teachers, supra. 
It may derive from "objectively demonstrable" public policy as expressed in 
"imperative" provisions of other applicable laws. Union Free School District, 
Town of Cheektowaga v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y. 2d 137 (1975) and Cohoes City School 
1 
District v. Cohoes Teachers Assn., _ N.Y. 2d , December 2, 1976. 
The "parity" clause here in question covers only the terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the unit for which it was 
negotiated. It is not prohibited by any plain and clear provisions of the Act 
itself, or of applicable external statute, or of decisional law or public 
policy derived from the conflicting and paramount imperative provisions of othelr 
1 Both these cases clarified in this respect the reference, quoted by the 
majority, in Susquehanna Valley, supra, to "[V]ublic policy, whether 
derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in, statute or 
decisional law, or in neither,,.". In each of the two later cases, 
the Court held that the public policy as to particular kinds of employ-
ment conditions contained in applicable provisions of the Education Law 
is paramount to the authority to negotiate under the Taylor Law and that a 
conflicting provision in a collective bargaining agreement must consequently 
fall as a matter, of- law. No such paramount public policy was found in the 
Education Law, or in the regulations promulgated under i t , to exist as to 
another kind of subject matter contained in the collective bargaining 
agreement reviewed and upheld as valid in New York City School Boards Assn 
y. The Board of Education and United Federation of Teachers, 39 N.Y. 2d 
111 (1976) . 
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law. Yet this Board has condemned the clause as a clearly and plainly 
prohibited subject of bargaining because it believes its presence in an 
agreement to be so pernicious as to deprive employees of their basic rights 
under the Act. I find that this analysis has no solid basis in the record 
and that it is subject to question on relevant grounds of established 
practice and countervailing opinion. 
Historically, "parity" at least as to basic wages, between police 
and fire forces has been the established pattern in New York City for three 
quarters of a century. A fixed wage relationship as between those uniformed 
2 . forces and sanitation workers has been in effect for some eight years. At 
various times, one force or the other has sought and obtained "parity" clauses 
in its collective bargaining agreements either by direct negotiation or 
through third-party intervention. In 1970, for example, the PBA (the 
charging party here) sought and obtained enforcement in the courts of a so-
called "vertical-parity" clause, establishing a fixed~rati'o between the salaries 
of patrolmen and sergeants it had included in ,3 collective bargaining 
agreement for patrolmen. PBA v. City of New York, 76 LRRM 3087 (1971), and 
PBA v. City of New York, 78 LRRM 2747 (1971) ., (neither decision officially 
reported), on remand from 27 N,Y. 2d 410 (1971)3. 
Looking at the way in which the ''me-too"-.kind of clause involved in 
this case has functioned in the conduct of collective bargaining in New 
York City, it would not, it seems to me, be unrealistic to observe that its 
inclusion may well have a beneficial effect on the bargaining relationship 
of the parties. Recourse to such clause may reasonably serve to promote 
~>.r. :! l 
2 ffifi.O 
Hearing Officer's report, footnote 6. TtOtVA* 
3 
For a more detailed description and analysis of the prevalence of the 
"parity" pattern and related bargaining devices of different unions in 
New York City, see: Spero and Capozzola, The TJrhan Community and Its 
Unionized Bureaucracies (The Social Science Series, University Press 
- of Cambridge, Mass,, 1973, at pp 134, 218-219). 
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the early resolution of bargaining disputes and the timely conclusion of an 
agreement by affording the necessary assurance to the contracting union that it 
will not risk less favorable treatment by an early settlement as against those 
in other units who may play for the competitive advantage of along wait-and-
see policy. Thus the strains and uncertainties of a protracted hiatus between 
contracts., and their inevitable threat to labor peace and the conduct of the 
governmental function, may well be avoided by the mechanism of the "parity" 
clause. 
Agencies administering other public employment relations statutes in 
two other states have found "parity" clauses not to be improper subjects ,6f 
collective bargaining agreements. West Allis Professional Policemen's Assn. 
v. City of West Allis, Decision #12706 (May 1974) of the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission; City of Detroit and Detroit Police Officers, Case No. 
C72 A-l, decided by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission December 29, 
1972. 
In the private sector, the National Labor Relations Board, in what 
appears to be its sole decision on this point, has found that a reverse type 
of "parity" provision (i.e., one favoring the employer if lesser benefits are 
reached elsewhere) demanded by an employer and adamantly insisted upon by him 
in the course of negotiations with a union representing his employees was 
a proper subject of collective bargaining. It held that the clause was 
therefore not in itself illegal and that the insistence did not constitute a 
bad-faith refusal to bargain. The Board characterized the employer's demand 
as "not an effort to impose wages and working conditions on other employers or 
employees in other bargaining units" but as "designed only to assure 
that this Employer could be relieved of any disadvantage that it might 
otherwise suffer if the Union subsequently negotiated more favorable wage 
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and benefit levels with other employers.." Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 
182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970).4 
In light of such countervailing considerations, i t would be difficult 
to conclude that the clause in dispute is so unquestionably in conflict with 
the Act or with other law as to establish beyond doubt its "plain and clear" 
5 
illegality. 
I cannot join the majority's position that its authority to ban as 
illegal a particular term or condition of employment properly derives 
from its general power to supervise the negotiating process. To be sure, 
the decision as to what kinds of substantive subjects (e.g. class size) are 
encompassed within the broad category of "terms and conditions" as to which 
the parties must negotiate is a function left to the expert competence of 
this Board to develop under the scheme of the Act. That role does not, 
however, embrace authority to outlaw a particular subject not prohibited by the 
Act or other appropriate law. Nor does the Board's confirmed authority 
to find an agency-shop provision to be prohibited support its 'claim of 
similar authority as to the type of clause here in question. The Appellate 
Division held that the agency shop "is made illegal by clear and definitive 
statutory mandates" and by a "crystal clear" showing of legislative intent in 
the improper practice provisions of the Act expressly prohibiting employer 
4 
The Board's decision was referred to in Sperry Systems Man. Div., Sperry 
Rand Corp, y. N.L.R.B., 492 F 2d 63 (C.A. 2, 1974) to distinguish the 
illegal situation in which an employer seeks to bargain with a union over 
the wages that the union will negotiate with other employers from the 
"Most-Favored Nations" clause negotiated for the benefit of the contracting 
employer's conditions. 
5 The hypothetical example in the majority opinion of how a "parity" clause 
of the "Most-Favored Nations" type here in question may affect the ability 
of a second labor organization to bargain as to matters of concern to the, 
employees in the unit it represents merely illustrates that success in nego-
tiations turns on the interplay, of relative bargaining strengths and skills, 
A strong union will turn back an employer's arguments based on his obligatidn 
to other employee units or to his customers or suppliers or bankers. The 
illustration would be aptly descriptive of the illegally restrictive effect 
of an agreement made for one unit which requires that its terms and con-
ditions be imposed on another unit. See Sperry Systems, supra. iSrV^/l 
That is not the case here. 'WURjt -£. 
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discriminatory conduct of the kind practiced under an agency shop. Farrigan 
..... ..... 
v. Helsbu, 42 A.D. 2d 265 (1973). The improper practice provision 
prohibiting in general terms a refusal to bargain in good faith expresses 
no such "crystal clear" intent to ban the making of a "parity" clause. 
I must conclude that in banning the "parity" clause, the Board is 
imposing upon the parties a public policy of the bargaining table not 
specified or defined by the statute or other applicable law and is thereby 
regulating those very substantive terms of wages, hours and working 
conditions which the Act has left to the parties to delineate for themselves. 
I find no indication that the Legislature put it to this Board to define such 
public policy through its processes. If a public policy is to be devised 
here, I believe that it should be declared by the Legislature. Until the 
Legislature moves to that point, I do not see how the Board can do so on 
7 
its own. 
Finally, as to the finding that the City violated the Act in its 
reliance upon the clause in negotiations with the PBA, the Board is inferring 
a lack of good faith solely and simply from the City's reference to the 
clause at the bargaining table and from its forceful reliance upon it as one 
of several arguments it put forward to the arbitration panel to support its 
bargaining position as to the extent of the wage increase it was willing to 
grant. 
Other decisions relied upon by the majority appear to me to be similarly 
inapposite. Doyle v. Troy seems to turn essentially on a preemption 
doctrine, holding that a city is precluded from dealing by charter with 
matters plainly within the broad scope of. the Taylor Law's jurisdiction. 
The Court did not hold that the "parity" provision there involved. would be 
prohibited if negotiated by the parties and included in a collective bar-
gaining agreement, OCB decisions deal only with whether the subject of 
"parity" is a mandatory or a permissive item, of bargaining. Which leaves 
only this Board's own Albany decision and that of the Connecticut Court, 
which I do not find adequate to support this Board's conclusion. 
7 
See N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477:fXlr96J)). 
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It is to be assumed that, but for its prohibition of the clause, the 
Board would not have found such bargaining strategy and advocacy to constitute 
bad-faith bargaining, As I do not agree with the prohibition, I cannot 
accept the bad-faith condemnation. 
I would dismiss the complaint. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
January 5, 1977: 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK #2C^l/5/77 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
International Association of Firefighters of the 
City of Newburgh, Local 589, 
Respondent, 
- and -
City of Newburgh, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Case No. U-2100 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Newburgh (Newburgh) on 
April 27, 1976. It alleges that International Association of Firefighters 
of the City of Newburgh, Local 589 (Local 589),refused to negotiate in good 
faith in violation of CSL §209-a.2(b) in that it unlawfully insisted upon 
the negotiation of a non-mandatory subject of negotiation involving minimum 
manpower and rig manning. The charge alleges that Local 589 demanded 
arbitration on such non-mandatory subjects of negotiation. The demand in 
question was for a "minimum number of men that must be on duty at all 
times per piece of fire fighting equipment." Local 589 acknowledges that it 
has insisted upon this demand and argues that the demand constitutes a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. As the dispute is one that involves a 
disagreement as to the scope of negotiations under the Taylor Law, it was 
processed under §204.4 of our Rules. This procedure permits the parties 
to present their arguments directly to this Board without the intermediate 
step of a report and recommendations from a hearing officer. The New York 
State Professional Firefighters Association, Inc. (PFFA) sought to 
intervene in the proceeding and was denied permission to do so, but it was 
permitted to participate amicus curiae. 
p> 
; • • • / 
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BACKGROUND 
The demand that is before us relates to the establishment of manpower 
needs and the deployment of personnel by a public employer in the performance 
of its essential fire-fighting function. It also bears upon the safety of 
firefighters. The establishment of manpower needs and the deployment of per-
sonnel by a public employer are management prerogatives and, thus, are not 
mandatory subjects of negotiation (Matter of City of White Plains,__5_PERB__3_008_ 
[White Plains I]). Safety as such, however, is a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation (White Plains I, supra). 
This presents a problem as to how to resolve these conflicting interests. 
On the one hand, municipal governments should be insulated from having to nego-
tiate over their manpower needs and the deployment of their employees because 
these are policy decisions as to the extent and level of service that they 
should provide to their constituents. On the other handj the right of fire-
fighters to negotiate contractual provisions designed to protect their safety 
should be recognized and preserved. In White Plains I we concluded that the 
total number of firefighters to be assigned to a platoon was not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation but that, because of apparent safety aspects, "the demand 
that a minimum number of Fire Fighters be on duty at all times with each engine 
and each truck [rig manning] constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiation." 
This compromise solution, reflecting our judgment of the appropriate balance 
between the legitimate interests of public employers and their employees, was 
applied in several cases, but it continued to be challenged by public employers. 
In Matter of White Plains PBA, 9 PERB 3007 (White Plains II), we were per-
suaded to reverse our position by, among other things, an argument of the City: 
"Both police and fire service involve inherently dangerous jobs. No 
amount of manpower, whether on a rig, or in a patrol car will ever 
make these jobs safe. Conversely, any increased manpower will pre-
sumably make the job safer...Safety agreements should not be sanc-
tioned to grant mandatory status to proposals directed at usurping 
decision making power over basic managerial decisions involving the level 
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of services a government elects to provide its constituents." 
In that decision we concluded, that the distinction between the safety impli-
cations of rig manning and other demands involving overall shift or platoon 
manning was an artificial one and we determined that rig manning was not auto-
matically a mandatory subject of negotiation. We recognized, at the same time, 
that the general item, of safety is a mandatory subject of collective negotia-r.. 
-tions,—but—reasoned—that—whether-a-particular_deniand_mrght^or"m±ght" not^be_a 
mandatory matter of negotiation depended upon the balance between its safety 
implications and its policy implications in the circumstances of the particular 
situation. Over the objection of one of our members, we rejected the proposed 
procedure of ruling "on safety aspects of manning on a case by case basis 
dependent upon the evidence adduced as to degree of hazard;;and restriction upon 
the mission of the public employer in each instance." We regarded that approach 
as placing an unwarranted burden upon the collective negotiation process 
because it would require, as a prior condition, that the negotiability of each 
manning/safety demand be determined by us after an extended factual hearing as 
to the balance between the two conflicting concerns. Accordingly, we suggested 
that the parties deal with their respective concerns through the negotiating 
process by creating joint safety committees which would operate under general 
guidelines specified in the contract and be made subject to the grievance pro-
cedure as to their application in specific situations. 
Concern on both sides, as reflected in the briefs, has been intensified as 
a result of a 1974 amendment to the Taylor Law mandating arbitration to resolve 
negotiation disputes involving police and fire departments. Representatives of 
municipalities argue that the availability of compulsory arbitration compels us, 
as a matter of law, to narrow the scope of mandatory negotiations in order to 
preserve the prerogatives of the elected representatives of government to 
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determine the priorities of a community. Representatives of firefighters argue, 
on the other hand, that the enactment of legislation imposing compulsory 
arbitration reflects an intention of the State Legislature to limit the pre-
rogatives of elected officials of local government. We find no basis in the 
legislation for either position and we reaffirm our conclusion first stated in 
Matter of City of Albany, 7 PERB 113079, that the enactment of a law compelling 
~arb~xtraTTxoTT~iirTroTiiTe^ 
contracted the mandatory scope of police and fire negotiations. 
In their briefs and oral presentations, Local 589 and PFFA argued that if 
given the opportunity to submit evidence they could demonstrate to this Board 
that the number of firefighters assigned to a fire engine or fire truck always 
has direct and substantial impact upon the safety of the firefighters and that, 
therefore, rig manning always is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
We welcomed the offer of Local 589 and PFFA to supply relevant information 
ans we invited Newburgh and various representatives of local governments and 
firefighters to participate in a factfinding hearing. Many accepted our invi-
tation and such a hearing was held on August 11 and 12, 1976. The information 
submitted at the hearing was enlightening and the memoranda that followed the 
hearing by two months were also useful. We are now able to consider the problen. 
with a greater knowledge of the consequences of rig manning for firefighter 
safety and of the range of options available to the public employer. 
During the hearing, witnesses for the firefighters made the following 
statements as to manning and its safety implications: In fighting a fire in a 
multi-story building, the men who operate the equipment afforded by a single 
rig, be it a truck or an engine, act as a unit. As the number of men in the 
unit is diminished, their efficiency is also diminished, with adverse conse-
quences for the safety of the remaining firefighters. For example, when 
standard equipment is used, three men ought to handle the hoses supplied by ,an 
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engine and three men ought to handle the ladders supplied by a truck. Other 
assignments also require teamwork by firefighters, and reduction in the size 
of the team increases the hazard to each firefighter. Exemplifying this, the 
use of an air mask diminishes a firefighter's efficiency; therefore, fire-
fighters in an undermanned unit may have to work without air masks in order to 
accomplish their assignments. 
Spokesmen for public employers made different assertions, as follows: 
Transportation to the site of the fire by a rig is not always a preferred 
manner of delivery. The frequent use of rigs at fires in other than multi-
story buildings, where a smaller complement of firefighters would suffice, 
might justify alternative means of delivering the manpower. This involves the 
question of the deployment of its manpower by the public employer. Moreover, 
not all equipment in use is standard. Many technological innovations are 
available. Water may be treated chemically to make it flow more quickly 
through narrower and lighter hoses. Automatic nozzles may eliminate the need 
for a firefighter at the pumper. Hydraulically raised buckets may ease the task 
of the men operating the ladders. 
DISCUSSION 
We are faced with the problem of determining whether the predominant 
characteristic of a demand for rig manning is safety or whether it is manpower 
and deployment. If it is the former, then we must find it to be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation; if it is the latter, we must conclude that it is not. 
While the record in the investigatory hearing indicated that rig manning 
may have certain aspects of safety, it does not establish that the subject is 
predominantly one of safety. It is our judgment that the predominant charac-
teristic of the rig manning demand is that of manpower and the deployment of 
firefighters. Thus, the demand is essentially one of management prerogative 
as to how best to service public safety needs and is not a mandatoEyj~s.ub4Ject of 
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negotiation. Accordinglyy while we conclude that a demand in general terms 
for firefighters' safety is a mandatory subject of negotiation, we determine 
that the specific demand for a "minimum number of men that must be on duty at 
all times per piece of fire fighting equipment" is not. This determination is 
rooted in the recognition that we are not dealing with a subject directly 
affecting only the employer and employee relationship, but rather we are dealing 
with a basic element of governmental policy bearing upon the extent and quality 
of service to the public (West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v. Helsby, 35 NY 2d 
46, 51 [1974]). 
Our conclusion is not to .be..construe.d„t.o jiaeanj£ha£„l;he safety .aspect of 
particular operating .conditions .in firefighting is beyond the •obligation of the 
parties to deal with in negotiations. As we have found here and in other cases, 
the general subject of safety as a means of protecting employees beyond the 
normal hazards inherent in their work is a mandatory item of negotiation. Hence, 
the presence of a general safety clause in the collective bargaining agreement 
should provide a basis for testing the safety guarantee in individual fact 
situations which may arise during the life of the agreement by presentation of 
disputes in such specific situations for resolution through the grievance pro-
cedure. 
Reliance upon general language is a characteristic of collective labor . ..: 
agreements, which are instruments of governance as much as they are an exchange 
of bilateral undertakings. The product of collective negotiations is an agree-
ment which is designed to govern the future relationships between the parties. 
However, it is not always desirable or possible to anticipate all the problems 
that will develop in the administration of the agreement. It is, therefore, 
not unusual for parties to negotiate a general safety clause. Exactly what 
constitutes a violation of the general safety clause is resolved by the parties 
on an ad hoc basis, with the dispute going to arbitration if the grievance is 
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not resolved earlier. 
This process, long recognized in the private sector, has been described 
by Prof. Archibald Cox (in Law and National Labor Policy, UCLA Institute, of 
Industrial Relations Monograph No. 5, Feb. 1960, pp 79-80): 
"The resulting contract is essentially an instrument of government, 
not merely an instrument of exchange....One cannot reduce all the 
rules governing a community like an industrial plant to fifteen or 
even^ fif-ty—pages.-. Tlie_j.ns-t±tutional_char_act:erist_i_cs and governmental 
nature of the collective bargaining process demand a common law of 
the shop which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement.... 
The generalities, the deliberate ambiguities, the gaps, the unforeseen 
contingencies, and the need for a rule even though the agreement is 
silent all require a creativeness in contract administration...." 
This approach is in accord with established labor policy in this country. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has declared that it is the public policy of this 
country that collective bargaining contract disputes should be resolved by 
grievance arbitration (see the Steelworkers' Trilogy: USWA v. American 
Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564; USWA v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574; and USWA v. Enterprise Wheel and Can Corp., 363 U.S. 593). This 
policy is applicable as well to grievances involving the interpretation of 
agreements negotiated under the Taylor Law (Associated Teachers of Huntington, 
Inc,, v. Huntington Union Free School District, 33 N,Y. 2d 229 [1973]). 
Moreover, it is not our intention to preclude the parties from dealing 
directly with the safety implications of matters of essential managerial pre-
rogative. While such matters are not mandatory subjects of negotiation, the 
parties may, nevertheless, voluntarily negotiate with respect to them. The Ne^jr 
York State Court of Appeals has determined that the parties may agree upon 
matters that are not mandatory subjects of negotiation so long as the agreement 
is not in violation of State law or of public policy. Furthermore, such agree-
ments are subject to the grievance machinery in the contract (Susquehanna Vall.ey 
Central School District at Conklin v. Susquehanna Teachers Association, 37 N.Y 
2d 614 [1975]). • i ' 
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NOW, THEREFORE, we determine that the International Association of 
Firefighters of the City of Newburgh, Local 589, has 
failed to negotiate in good faith with the City of 
Newburgh by improperly insisting upon the negotiation of 
a demand "for a minimum number of men that must be on duty 
at all times per a piece of fire fighting equipment," 
and 
WE ORDER the International Association of Firefighters of the City of 
Newburgh, Local 589, to negotiate in good faith with the City 
of Newburgh. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
January 5, 1977 
Joseph R. Crowley~^xX 
<£$-#-, /C^-eg^c^-.-
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-l/5/77 
In the Matter of ' 
FARMINGDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
FARMINGDALE ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRA-
TORS AND SUPERVISORS, 
Case No.c-12 92 
Petitioner. 
PERB 58( 
CERTIFTCATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
abpve matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested'in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY .CERTIFIED that Farmingdale Association of 
Administrators and Supervisors 
has-been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above namedpublic employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: included: Principals, assistant principals, directors 
"and chairmen.. 
Excluded: All other emraloyees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named' public employei 
shall negotiate collectively with the Farmingdale Association of 
Administrators and Supervisors. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 5th day of January 19 77 
ROBERT D . HELSBY ,/CIIAIRf RMAN 
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H3C-1/S/77 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE ROLES OF PROCEDURE 
OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD • 
1/6/77, 
Section 200.10 is hereby amended as follows: v.. 
V 
§200.10 Filing; Service. (a) The term "filing", as used herein, shall mean [personal 
service upon] delivery to the Board or an agent thereof, or the act of mailing to the 
Board not less' than two days before the due date 'of any filing. 
(b) The term "service", as used herein, shall mean [personal service] delivery to 
or the act of mailing not less than two days before the due date. 
Section 201.12 (d) is hereby amended as follows:-
§201.12(d) A request for an extension of time within which to file exceptions and 
briefs, shall be in writing and filed with the Board at least three working days before 
the expiration of the required time for filing, provided that the Board may extend the 
time during which to request an extension of time because of extraordinary circumstances. v 
A party requesting an extension of time shall notify all the parties to the proceeding 
of its request and shall indicate to the Board the position of each other party.with 
regard to such request, [shall indicate the position of the other parties with regard to / 
such request, and copies of such request snail simultaneously be served upon each party 
to the proceeding.] ' 
Section 204.2 (a) is hereby amended as follows: 
§204.2 (a) Notice of hearing. After a charge is filed, the Director shall review the 
charge to determine whether the facts as alleged may constitute an.improper practice, 
as set forth in section 209-a of the Act. If it is determined that the facts as 
alleged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a violation, [the charge] or that the 
alleged violation occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the charge, it 
shall be dismissed by the Director'subject to review by the Board under section 204.10(c) 
of these Rules; otherwise, except where section 204.2(b) is applicable, a notice of 
hearing shall be prepared by the Director or a designated hearing officer, and, 
together with a copy of the charge, shall be delivered to the charging party and each 
named respondent. The notice of hearing shall fix the place of hearing at a time not 
less than fifteen working days from issuance thereof. 
A new subparagraph is added to subsection 204.3 (c), to be subparagraph (3), to • 
read as follows: , 
§204.3 (c) (3) Where appropriate, the answer shall include a statement that the 
alleged violation occurred more than four months - prior to the filing of the charge. 
454S v 
Rule Amendment 1/6/77 -2' , 
Section 204.4 (a) is hereby amended as follows: 
§204.4 (a) Immediately subsequent to .the-'conference referred to in section 204.2 (b), 
and if one or more of the parties have made a request that a dispute involving primarily 
a disagreement as to the scope of negotiations under the Act be processed expeditiously, 
or if the Director shall determine to do so upon his own' initiative, the Director shall 
so notify the Board and transmit the papers to the Board. The Board shall then inform, 
the parties as to whether it will accord expedited" treatment to the matter. If the 
Board determines that the matter will be expedited, it will also notify the respondent 
of the due date for its answer, and the parties of the due date for briefs. The Board 
may also direct that oral argument be held.before it,, or' that a hearing be held before 
the full Board, or one of Its members, or a hearing officer. If the Board determines 
that expedited treatment will not be accorded, the matter will be handled In accordance 
with subdivisions 2 (a), 3 and 5 through 15 of this section. 
A hew subparagraph Is added to Section 204.7, to be subparagraph (1), to read 
as' follows: ' f 
§204.7 (1) Although not raised by the Director under section 204.2 of these Rules or 
by the respondent in its answer under section 204.3 (c) (3), a motion may be made to 
dismiss a charge, or the hearing officer may do so at his own Initiative on the ground 
that the alleged violation occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the 
charge, "but only if the failure of timeliness was first revealed during the hearing. 
An objection to the timeliness of the charge, if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived. . 
Section 204.12-is hereby amended as follows: 
§204.12 Request for Extension of Time. A request for an extension of time within which 
to file exceptions and briefs shall be in writing [,] and filed with the Board at least 
three working days before the expiration of the required time for filing, provided that 
the Board may extend the time during which to request an extension of time because of extr 
ordinary circumstances. A party requesting an extension of time shall notify all the 
parties to the proceeding of its request and shall indicate to the Board the position of 
each other party with regard to such request, [shall indicate the position of the other 
parties with regard to such request. Copies of such request shall be served on each 
party to the proceeding and proof of service thereof shall be filed with the Board 
together with the request.] , • 
Rule Amendment -3 
Section 205.9 i s hereby amended as follows: 
§205.9 Determination and Award. ; :": 
! . 
The determination and award of the arbitration panel shall be in writing, 
signed and acknowledged by each member of the arbitration panel, and shall, be 
celivered to the parties either personally or by registered or certified mail, return 
receipt requested. Within five worluLng days of rendering the determination and award, 
the arbitration panel shall file two copies of the determination and award with the 
Director of Conciliation. 
Section 206.4 is hereby amended as follows: 
§206.4 Hotice of Hearing. 
After receipt of a charge filed by the chief legal officer of a government' 
involved or the Counsel, the Board shall issue to the parties a notice setting forth 
the time and place of the hearing, which time shall be not less than eight working 
days after the service of the notice. 
Section 206.7 (a) is hereby amended as follows: 
§206.7 (a) After completion of the hearing, or upon the consent of the parties, 
the hearing officer, if any, shall submit the case, including his report and 
recommendations, to the Board. The record shall include the charge, notice of 
hearing, motions, rulings, orders, stenographic report of the hearing, stipulations, 
exceptions, documentary evidence and any briefs or other documents submitted by the 
parties. The Board shall cause the report and recommendations of the hearing 
officer, if any, to be delivered to all parties to the proceeding. Briefs may 
be filed by any party within seven working days after receipt of the report.and 
recommendations of the hearing officer, if any; provided, however, that the Board 
may extend the time during which briefs may be filed because of extraordinary cir-
cumstances.. An original and four copies of the briefs shall be filed with the Board. 
Rule' Amendment. -4 
Section 208.1 (f)'is hereby amended as follows: 
§208.1 (f) Awards [to] of_ arbitrators •'filed with the Director of Conciliation under 
Parts 205 and 207 of these Rules. 
The second note between subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 208.3 is 
hereby amended as follows: 
Note: Since [the nature of] most of PERB's records [is such that they] are 
intended for the guidance of, and to be helpful to, various segments of the public, 
they are ordinarily available for inspection on the day that, a request is received. 
However, if a request is made to inspect large numbers of records, PERB reserves the 
right to require reasonable advance notice of such request. 
Section 208.3 (d) is hereby amended as follows: 
(d) Except as provided in subdivision (e) of this section, a fee of [ten] twenty-five 
cents per page will be charged for all copies made upon request by anyone other.than 
a representative of a public employer or employee organization or a member of a Board 
panel, to whom one copy of a document may be given without charge. The Board will-
make every effort to comply with requests for such copies as expeditiously as possible. 
Section 208.5 is hereby amended as follows': 
§208.5 Appeal. 
(a) An appeal .may be taken to the chairman of the Board within [thirty] twenty 
working days from: ' ' , 
(1) denial of a request for access to records; 
(2)- a failure to provide access to records within five working days after 
receipT—of—a— request; ; '—. : 
(b) The appeal shall be in writing and shall state: 
(1) the date of the appeal; 
(2) the date and location of the request for records; 
(3) the records to which the requester was denied access; 
(4) whether the appeal is from denial of access or from failure to provide 
access. If from the former, a copy of the denial shall be attached to the 
appeal; 
(5) the name and return address of the requester. 
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